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Money Laundering, and the
Suspicious Activity Report
INTRODUCTION
n general, American law imposes no duty to report crimes.'
American jurisprudence has long viewed legal sanctions for
failure to report crime as repugnant. While a misprision of felony2 statute
has appeared in the United States criminal code since 1790,' the courts
have interpreted that law to punish active concealment rather than passive
non-reporting.4 Instead of imposing a legal responsibility to report, the
'The commentary to the Model Penal Code notes that the vast majority of
jurisdictions attach "no penalty to simple failure to inform authorities of criminal
conduct." MODEL PENAL CODE § 242.5 commentary at 251 (1962).
2 "The offense of concealing a felony committed by another." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1000 (6th ed. 1990). Misprision of felony does not apply to
accomplices to the felony itself. Id.
3 18 U.S.C. § 4 (1994) provides:
Whoever, having knowledge of the actual commission of a felony
cognizable by a court of the United States, conceals and does not
as soon as possible make known the same to some judge or other
person in civil or military authority under the United States, shall
be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or
both.
4 For cases interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 4, see Gerald E. Lynch, The Lawyer
as Informer, 1986 DUKE L.J. 491, 519 n.118. To date, only one court has
convicted a defendant of misprision. See State v. Han, 40 N.J.L. 228 (N.J.
Super. Ct. 1878). In the modem era, prosecutors occasionally employ the statute
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American legal system has consigned the question of whether to report
crime to individual and collective morality. As Justice Marshall wrote for
the Supreme Court in 1822: "It may be the duty of a citizen to accuse
every offender, and to proclaim every offense which comes to his
knowledge; but the law which would punish him in every case, for not
performing this duty is too harsh for man."5
While this general distaste for required reporting of crimes continues,
several signs point toward a growing acceptance of specific reporting
requirements. In Part I, this Note examines several manifestations of an
emerging duty imposed on citizens and businesses to report criminal
wrongdoing to law enforcement authorities.6 As a case study of the
growing duty to report, this Note focuses, in Part II, on the reports
required of banks and non-bank financial institutions under federal
money-laundering statutes Part mH explores challenges to the reporting
duties.' As a specific example of the expansive and unusual duty to
report criminal conduct imposed on the banking industry, Part IV
examines the provisions of the new Suspicious Activity Report ("SAR") 9
that took effect in December, 1995.0 In Part V, this Note details the
politics and policy behind the SAR." Part VI examines the liability of
banks for reporting and for failure to report. 2 This Note then, in Part
VII, briefly explores similar reporting duties under the money laundering
laws of other countries. 3 Finally, Part VIII suggests possible areas in
in plea negotiations and for cases in which they lack adequate proof of the
defendant's involvement in the crime itself. Daniel B. Yeager, A Radical
Community of Aid: A Rejoinder to Opponents of Affirmative Duty to Help
Strangers, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. -1, 32-34 (1993).
5 Marbury v. Brooks, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 556, 575-76 (1822). For a general
discussion of misprision and for details on the history behind the quote (Marshall
did not want to force William Marbury to report his son-in-law), see Yeager,
supra note 4, at 30-38.
6 See infra notes 16-42 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 43-59 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 60-69 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 70-114 and accompanying text.
'O Major New Suspicious Activity Reporting Duties Announced, MONEY
LAUNDERING ALERT (Alert Int'l, Inc.), Sept. 1995, at 1 [hereinafterMajor New
Suspicious Activity].
" See infra notes 115-55 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 156-214 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 215-44 and accompanying text.
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which the money laundering reporting requirements may expand. 4 This
Note concludes by examining the implications of the reporting
requirements. The reporting duty, in effect, transforms banks into agents
of the government and undermines the bank-customer relationship.
However, the alternatives seem equally unattractive."
I. INDICATIONS OF AN EMERGING DUTY TO REPORT CRIME
A number of exceptions to the general rule that citizens have no duty
to report crime 6 suggest an emerging acceptance of legally-mandated
reporting in specific instances despite the prevailing reluctance to
recognize a broader duty. This emerging acceptance of legal reporting
duties echoes in the dicta of Supreme Court opinions. In contrast to the
strong rhetoric of Justice Marshall in 1822,"7 the Supreme Court recently
stated that the "[c]oncealment of crime has been condemned throughout
our history .... [G]ross indifference to the duty to report known
criminal behavior remains a badge of irresponsible citizenship."' 8
The growth of specific reporting requirements includes sweeping
statutes in some jurisdictions and more obscure enactments in others.' 9
Perhaps the broadest examples of the growing legal duty to report crime
appear in the statutes of Massachusetts, Ohio, and Washington which
mandate the reporting of felonies.20 More narrow reporting duties
include widespread statutes requiring physicians to report gunshot and
knife wounds; 21 virtually universal laws mandating that physicians,
'4 See infra notes 245-57 and accompanying text.
's See infra notes 258-60 and accompanying text.
16 See supra.note 1.
17 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
18 Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 557-58 (1980).
'9 In addition to statutes that compel reporting, state and federal
governments have also passed whistle-blower laws to protect public and private
employees who voluntarily report violations of the law. E.g., KY. REv. STAT.
ANN. §§ 61.102-.103 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1995). For an analysis of the factors
involved in considering when an employee should report, see generally Albert
D. Clark, Ethical Implications of Whistle Blowing, 42 LA. B.J. 363 (1994).
20 MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 268, § 40 (Law. Co-op. 1992); OHIo REV. CODE
ANN. § 2921.22 (Anderson 1993); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9.69.100 (West
1992). See Jack Wenik, Note, Forcing the Bystander to Get Involved. A Case for
a Statute Requiring Witnesses to Report Crime, 94 YALE L.J. 1787, 1801-04
(1985).
23 E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 12-12-601 to -603 (Michie 1995); OHIO REv.
1995-96] 645
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mental health workers, and school personnel report child abuse;22
statutes requiring that undertakers and hospitals report suspicious
deaths;23 laws compelling parking garage owners to report bullet holes
in cars;24 a growing number of codes and rules of professional conduct
requiring that attorneys report misconduct by other lawyers;25 and court
decisions compelling psychiatrists to report dangerous patients.26
Generally, these statutes compel the reporting of grave misconduct or
severe danger.27 Most reporting requirements focus on a discrete class
with unique expertise and knowledge narrowly related to the information
required.2" Frequently, the states have imposed the reporting
requirements on groups that have benefitted from licensing and bear
significant professional duties of care.29 In these cases the reporting
duties seem commensurate with the benefits conferred and the burdens
already imposed.3"
The world of business associations has its own set of specific, and
growing, duties and incentives to report criminal conduct. These corporate
duties differ dramatically from those imposed on the citizenry as
individuals: most conspicuously, these reporting obligations often require
the corporation to inform upon itself.3 The requirement of self-reporting
CODE ANN. § 2921.22(B) (Anderson 1993).
22 E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 11166 (West Supp. 1996).
23 E.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 4140-4143 (McKinney 1985).
24 E.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-26-12 (1982).
25 E.g., MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-103(A)
(1981); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.3(a) (1992); see
Lynch, supra note 4, at 501-17. For a general discussion of the merits of
requiring lawyers to report criminal conduct, see Paul R. Tremblay, Ratting, 17
AM. J. TRIAL. ADvOc. 49 (1993).26 E.g., Tarasoffv. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 343-44 (Cal.
1976).
27 See Lynch, supra note 4, at 519-20.
28 id.
29 The argument that the benefits of licensing and the burdens of
professional regulations justify commensurate reporting duties clearly applies to
the banking industry. If physicians must report suspicions wounds and teachers
must report suspicions of abuse, then it seems fair to require bankers to report
suspicious financial transactions. See Pamela H. Bucy, Epilogue: The Fight
Against Money Laundering: A New Jurisprudential Direction, 44 ALA. L. REV.
839, 847-50 (1993) (arguing that the imposition of reporting requirements under
the money laundering laws is necessary and appropriate).
30 See id.
" See infra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
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by corporations exists because corporations, unlike citizens, enjoy none
of the protections of the Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-
incrimination.32
Certainly, the most prominent duties of corporate reporting arise
under the securities laws.3 The most rapidly growing duty to report
originates under the environmental laws.34 In addition to the actual
duties imposed on corporations, the United States Sentencing Guidelines
and Justice Department prosecutorial guidelines provide significant
incentives for self-reporting.35
32 E.g., Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 206 (1988) ("There also is no
question that the foreign bank cannot invoke the Fifth Amendment in declining
to produce the documents; the privilege does not extend to such artificial
entities."); Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 89-90 (1974) ("[No artificial
organization may utilize the personal privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination .... ).
" Securities Exchange Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1994) (requiring
full disclosure of material information in the registration of publicly offered
securities); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1994)
(prohibiting material misrepresentations relating to the trading of securities), §
13 (prohibiting material misrepresentations in mandatory annual, quarterly, and
special reports to the SEC), § 14 (prohibiting material misrepresentations in
proxy solicitation of registered securities and prohibiting material
misrepresentations during tender offers). These statutes, and the accompanying
SEC rules, could be read to require a corporation to report its involvement in
criminal conduct because a reasonable shareholder would find such involvement
significant in his or her deliberations regarding the sale or purchase of the
corporation's stock. For a general description of disclosure requirements under
the securities laws, see HERBERT S. WANDER & RUSSELL N. PALLESEN,
DEVELOPMENTS IN SECURITIES LAW DISCLOSURE (1995), available in
WESTLAW, 907 PLI/Corp 327.
34 E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 9603 (1988) (requiring, under CERCLA, the reporting
of certain releases of hazardous substances). For a general description of
reporting requirements imposed under federal statutes and state common law, see
ROBERT L. GRAHAM, DISCLOSURE AND DUE DILIGENCE OBLIGATIONS ARISING
FROM BuSINESS STATUTES AND REGULATIONS HAVING ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACTS (1990), available in WESTLAW, 716 PLI/Corp 153. For an analysis
of the overlap of the environmental and securities reporting requirements, see
Robert H. Feller, Environmental Disclosure and the Securities Laws, 22 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 225 (1995).
35 See MARK L. MANEWITZ & WILLIAM M.A. PORTER, VOLUNTARY
DIsCLOSuRE IN ENVIRONMENTAL MATTERS, AND THE EFFECT OF SENTENCING
AND PROSECUTORIAL-DISCRETION GUIDELINES (1993), available in WESTLAW,
457 PLI/Lit 11; Pamela H. Bucy, Organizational Sentencing Guidelines: The
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
The Sentencing Guidelines provide for decreased corporate fines
based on self-reporting, recognition and acceptance of responsibility, and
cooperation by the corporation.36 The amount of the reduction in
sentence depends on the stage at which the corporation comes forward.37
The corporation reaps the greatest benefit if it reports prior to the
commencement of a government investigation and reasonably promptly
after it discovers the wrongdoing." The Guidelines also provide
incentives for effective corporate compliance programs.3
Similarly, the Department of Justice Antitrust Division ("DOT')
guidelines for corporate leniency provide incentives for self-reporting."
Rather than promising a reduced sentence, the DOJ guidelines hold out
the prospect that a corporation may avoid liability entirely by self-
reporting. In effect, the DOJ guidelines spell out the elements of
prosecutorial discretion involved in deciding whether to indict a
corporation despite self-reporting.4' The leniency policy directs the
inquiry into the following factors: (1) whether the corporation came
forward on its own; (2) whether DOJ had developed enough evidence for
Cart before the Horse, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 329, 332-33 (1993); Richard S.
Gruner, Reducing Corporate Criminal Liability Through Post-OffenseResponses,
in ORGANIZING FOR CORPORATE COMPLIANCE: AvOID CORPORATE
LAWBREAKING THROUGH PREVENTIVE LAWYERING: AN ALI-ABA COURSE OF
STUDY (1992), available in WESTLAW, C800 ALI-ABA 159; Michael P.
Kenney & William R. Mitchelson, Jr., Corporate Benefits ofProperly Conducted
Internal Investigations, 11 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 657, 660-62 (1995); Jennifer
Moore, Corporate Culpability under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 34 ARIZ.
L. REv. 743, 790-92 (1992); Charles J. Walsh & Alissa Pyrich, Corporate
Compliance Programs as a Defense to Criminal Liability: Can a Corporation
Save Its Soul?, 47 RUTGERS L. REv. 605, 671-76 (1995).
For an analysis of whether providing immunity for self-reporting promotes
contempt for the laws, see Keri A. Gould, Turning Rat and Doing Time for
Uncharged, Dismissed, or Acquitted Crimes: Do the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines Promote Respect for the Law?, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 835
(critiquing the use of downward departure authority under the United States
Sentencing Guidelines to obtain the assistance of defendants in the investigation
and prosecution of other crimes).
36 UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMM'N, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C4.1
(Nov. 1995) [hereinafter USSG].
37 Id.
38 Id. § 8C2.5(g)(1).
39 Id. § 8C2.5(f).
40 Antitrust Div., United States Dep't of Justice, Corporate Leniency Policy
(Aug. 10, 1993), available in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,113 (1993).
41 Id.
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a prosecution before the corporation reported; (3) whether the corporation
promptly terminated the conduct; (4) whether the corporation reported
and cooperated fully; (5) whether the report reflects a corporate decision
rather than merely a judgment by individuals within the organization; (6)
whether the corporation has made restitution for any injury; and (7)
whether leniency would result in inequity.
4
These various corporate duties and incentives all pose the question of
whether a corporation must report criminal conduct for which it might
face prosecution. In contrast, the duties imposed on individuals involve
reports of criminal, or possibly criminal, conduct by others. This
divergence suggests the following question: Does the law impose a duty
on businesses, analogous to the duty sometimes imposed on individuals,
to report criminal conduct by others?
II. REPORTING OBLIGATIONS
UNDER THE MONEY LAUNDERING LAWS
Federal money laundering laws impose a distinct set of reporting
duties on business and financial institutions. Unlike the corporate
reporting requirements mentioned above,43 these reporting duties more
closely resemble those imposed on individual citizens. Like private
individuals, businesses and financial institutions must comply with the
money laundering laws and report conduct of others as opposed to their
own conduct.'
The details of the money laundering reporting requirements make
sense only in the context of the federal money laundering scheme as a
whole. Two distinct sets of statutes address money laundering: the first
defines and criminalizes substantive conduct,45 while the second imposes
various reporting requirements." The substantive statutes make it illegal
to knowingly enter into a transaction to conceal or disguise illegal
proceeds, 47 to enter into a transaction to augment unlawful activity,
48
42 Id.
41 See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
44 See infra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
41 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-57 (1994); 31 U.S.C. § 5324 (1994).
46 Money Laundering Provisions may be found at 26 U.S.C. § 60501 (1994);
31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-5322 (1994); 31 C.F.R § 103.23 (1995); 31 C.F.R. § 103.24
(1995). Regulatory Provisions may be found at 12 U.S.C. § 1818(5) (1994); 12
C.F.R. § 21.21 (1995).




to use a financial institution in a transaction that involves criminally
derived property,49 and to structure a transaction to avoid a reporting
requirement." The reporting requirements" mandate reporting by
financial institutions of cash transactions over $10,000,2 reporting by
citizens transporting over $10,000 out of the country,53 reporting of
accounts in foreign financial institutions,54 and, reporting by trades or
businesses involved in cash transactions of over $10,000."5 In addition,
financial institutions must file suspicious activity reports.56
Obviously, most of the conduct (large cash transactions, transportation
of large amounts of currency into or out of the country, and holding
foreign bank accounts) reported under the money laundering laws would
not qualify as criminal. These reports of predominantly innocent activity,
49 Id. § 1957(a), 1957(f).
50 d. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(ii); 31 U.S.C. § 5324 (1994).
", For a detailed description of each reporting requirement, see Frank C.
Razzano, American Money Laundering Statutes: The Case for a Worldwide
System of Banking Compliance Programs, 3 J. INT'L L. & PRAC. 277, 279-88
(1994).
52 The Currency Transaction Report ("CTR"), IRS Form 4789. See 31
U.S.C. § 5313 (1994); 31 C.F.R. § 103.22 (1995).
5' The Report of International Transportation of Currency or Monetary
Instruments ("CMIR"), Customs Form 4790. See 31 U.S.C. § 5316 (1994); 31
C.F.R. § 103.23 (1995).
5' The Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts ("FBAR"), Treasury
Form 90-22. See 31 U.S.C. § 5314(a) (1994); 31 C.F.R. § 103.24 (1995).
Officials suspect that non-compliance with this reporting requirement runs
rampant. In a typical year, -the public files only 100,000 FBARs despite the
prevalence of accounts in foreign banks. FinCEN Imposes First Penalty for
Failure to File "F-BAR ", MONEY LAUNDERING ALERT (Alert Int'l, Inc.), May
1, 1995, at 6.
" The Report of Cash Payments over $10,000 Received in a Trade or
Business, IRS Form 8300. See I.R.C. § 60501 (1994); Treas. Reg. § 60501
(1993).
56 The Suspicious Activity Report, Federal Reserve Board Form 2230; FDIC
Form 6710/06A; Office of the Comptroller of the Currency Form 8010-9, 8010-
1; Office of Thrift Supervision Form 366; National Credit Union Administration
Form 2362; Treasury Form [number pending]. See 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g) (1994);
31 C.F.R. § 103.21 (proposed, effective date Apr. 1, 1996); 12 C.F.R. §§ 208,
211, 225 (proposed, effective date Apr. 1, 1996); 12 C.F.R. § 353 (proposed,
effective date Apr. 1, 1996).
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however, provide the grist for the mill of federal investigation into
suspicious financial conduct by allowing law enforcement officials, using
computers, to piece together a mosaic of money laundering. 7 These
reports contrast dramatically with the suspicious activity reports. While
currency reporting requires financial institutions to report readily
identifiable conduct whether or not it is criminal (on the assumption that
such activity correlates with illegality),"8 suspicious activity reports force
financial institutions to employ far more diligent oversight and to use
discretion in deciding what to report.5 9
I1. CHALLENGES TO THE REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
The reporting requirements have survived numerous challenges to
their authority with courts uniformly upholding the validity and
constitutionality of the statutory scheme.6" The statutory authority for the
reporting duties generally stems from the Bank Secrecy Act ("BSA"),6'
the legislation that created the framework of money laundering offenses.
The specific authority for the suspicious activity reports arises from the
Annunzio-Wylie Act.62 The BSA provides that the Treasury Department
may "require certain reports or records where they have a high degree of
usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory investigations or pro-
"' There Will Be Gold for Federal Agents in New SAR System, MONEY
LAUNDERING ALERT (Alert Int'l, Inc.), July 1, 1995, at 3.
58 See Jeremy H. Temkin, "Hollow Ritual[s]". The Fifth Amendment and
Self-Reporting Schemes, 34 UCLA L. REV. 467, 471 (1986) (analyzing the
relationship between reporting requirements and the privilege against self-
incrimination).
s See infra notes 10 1-03 and accompanying text.
60 E.g., California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 57-78 (1974)
(rejecting a variety of challenges to the Bank Secrecy Act reporting
requirements).
6 Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114-1124 (codified
as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1730(d), 1829(b), 1951-59; 18 U.S.C. § 6002, 31
U.S.C. §§ 321, 5311-5314, 5316-5322).
62 Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act of 1992, Pub. L. 102-550,
106 Stat. 4044-4074 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and
22 U.S.C.); Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-
325, 108 Stat. 2254 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 5318).
1995-96]
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ceedings."63 The courts have supported the Department's findings that
various reporting and record-keeping requirements aid the government in
criminal, tax, and regulatory investigations and proceedings.' More
generally, the courts have ruled that Congress has the power to require
reports from businesses if those reports bear a relation to matters which
are made the subject of inquiry by legitimate enabling legislation.65
Reporting requirements have withstood two types of challenge based
on alleged violations of privacy rights under the Federal Right to
Financial Privacy Act ("RFPA") 66 and under the United States
Constitution. The RFPA prevents banks from divulging customer
information, however, the Act specifically states that its provisions
shall not "preclude any financial institution ... from notifying a
Government authority that such institution ... has information which
may be relevant to a possible violation of any statute or regulation."'6
The courts have ruled that this provision allows the full range of
required reporting under the BSA and Annunzio-Wylie. 61 Claims that
the money laundering reporting requirements violate Fourth Amendment
privacy rights and other constitutional protections have similarly
failed.
69
63 31 U.S.C. § 5311 (1994).
' E.g., United States v. Tobon-Builes, 706 F.2d 1092, 1097 (11th Cir.
1983).
65 E.g., Stark v. Connally, 347 F. Supp. 1242, 1250 (D. Cal. 1972), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part on other grounds by California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416
U.S. 21 (1974).
"6 Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 ("RFPA"), Pub. L. 95-630, 92
Stat. 3697 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
67 12 U.S.C.A. § 3403(c) (West 1995).
68 E.g., Velasquez-Campuzano v. Marfa Nat'l Bank, 896 F. Supp. 1415,
1420-22 (W.D. Tex. 1995) (holding that bank did not violate RFPA by filing
suspicious activity report).
69 E.g., California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 67 (1974) ("To the
extent that the regulations in connection with such transactions require the bank
to obtain information from a customer simply because the Government wants it,
the information is sufficiently described and limited in nature, and sufficiently
related to a tenable congressional determination as to improper use of
transactions of that type in interstate commerce, so as to withstand the Fourth
Amendment challenge made by the bank plaintiffs."); United States v. Richter,
610 F. Supp. 480, 491-93 (D. Ii. 1985), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 855 (1986)
(holding that reporting requirements do not violate Fourth or Fifth Amendment
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IV. THE SUSPICIOUS AcrIvlTY REPORT
Beginning in December, 1995, the Treasury Department" required
financial institutions7 to file a single Suspicious Activity Report
("SAX" detailing criminal and suspected criminal conduct. The SAR
collects various previously fragmented reports73 into one form and
significantly expands the detail with which financial institutions must
report suspicious activity. The SAR and its predecessors represent a
dramatic break from other reporting duties imposed on American
business: rather than requiring a business to report its own wrongdoing,
the SAR mandates that a business report criminal conduct by citizens and
other businesses. In effect, the banking community must observe a narrow
version of the duty to report crimes that society generally rejects.
The Secretary of the Treasury issued regulations detailing the SAR
under the broad authority granted by the BSA74 to require record-
keeping, reporting, anti-money laundering programs, know-your-
customer, and compliance programs.75 Specifically, the Annunzio-Wylie
Act provided the authority to require the reporting of suspicious and
criminal activity.76 The Money Laundering Suppression Act expanded
protections).
70 The Treasury Department acted in coordination with the various
supervisory agencies that regulate financial institutions: the Federal Reserve
System, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, the Office of Thrift Supervision, and the National Credit
Union Administration. See supra note 56.
" Including commercial banks, thrifts, credit unions, and other depository
institutions. See 31 C.F.R. § 103.11(c) (1995) (defining "bank").
72 For a copy of the Suspicious Activity Report and Instructions, see infra
app. at pp. 680-84.
' Previous law required banks to complete the Criminal Referral Form,
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency Form CC-8010-08 or CC-9010-09. See
12 U.S.C. § 21.11 (a) (1994). Previous regulations required banks making a cash
transaction report to check a suspicious transaction box if appropriate. Line 1(c)
of IRS Form 4798. For a more detailed description of previous suspicious
activity reporting, see Razzano, supra note 51, at 285-86.
7' Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114-1124, (codified
as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1730(d), 1829(b), 1951-59; 18 U.S.C. § 6002, 31
U.S.C. §§ 321, 5311-5314, 5316-5322).
75 See 60 Fed. Reg. 46,556, 46,557 (1995) (providing general background
on statutory authority for reporting and compliance programs).
76 Anunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act of 1992, Pub. L. 102-550,
106 Stat. 4044-4074 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and
1995-96]
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that authority and required a single report to a single governmental
recipient, rather than the scattered reports previously mandated."
Pursuant to this legislation, the Treasury Department transferred
authority for administering the reporting requirements, including
the newly-authorized single SAR, to the Financial Crimes Enforce-
ment Network ("FinCEN"), a division of the Department of the
Treasury.
7 8
The statutory authority for the SAR lies in 31 U.S.C. § 5318. That
section generally provides that the Secretary of the Treasury may require
"appropriate procedures to ensure compliance" with reporting
requirements79 and specifically authorizes suspicious activity reporting
as directed by the Secretary: "The Secretary may require any financial
institution... to report any suspicious transaction relevant to a possible
violation of law or regulation."" ° The statute prohibits the disclosure of
any report to any of the participants in the suspicious transaction in
question: "A financial institution ... [that] voluntarily reports a
suspicious transaction, or that reports a suspicious transaction pursuant to
this section or any other authority, may not notify any person involved
in the transaction that the transaction has been reported." 2
In order to protect the reporting financial institution from liability, the
statute includes a safe harbor provision designed to provide immunity
from defamation claims and other lawsuits:
Any financial institution that makes a disclosure of any possible
violation of law or regulation or a disclosure pursuant to this subsection
or any other authority, and any director, officer, employee, or agent of
such institution, shall not be liable to any person under any law or
regulation of the United States or any constitution, law, or regulation of
any State or political subdivision thereof, for such disclosure or for any
failure to notify the person involved in the transaction or any other
person of such disclosure."
22 U.S.C.); Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-
325, 108 Stat. 2254 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 5318).
" The Money Laundering Suppression Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-325, 108
Stat. 2160 (1994).
78 31 C.F.R. § 103 (1995).
7' 31 U.S.C.A. § 5318(a)(2) (West Supp. 1995).
80 Id. § 5318(g)(1).
81 Id. § 5318(g)(2).
82 Id.
83 Id. § 5318(g)(3).
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In addition to providing authority for the SAR, the Annunzio-Wylie Act
grants the Secretary broad power to mandate programs, policies, and
procedures designed to deter money laundering and improve reporting
compliance.1
4
The regulations promulgated by the Treasury Department appear to
interpret the statutory authority liberally and suggest the possibility of a
much wider array of reporting requirements. In addition, the regulations
suggest that the Treasury believes it has the authority under the statute to
expand the reporting requirement beyond financial institutions:
If the Secretary of the Treasury finds, upon the Secretary's own
initiative or at the request of an appropriate Federal or State law
enforcement official, that reasonable grounds exist for concluding that
additional recordkeeping and/or reporting requirements are necessary
to carry out the purposes of this part and to prevent persons from
evading the reporting/recordkeeping requirements of this part, the
Secretarymay issue an order requiring any domestic financial institution
or group of domestic financial institutions in a geographic area and any
other person participating in the type of transaction to file a report in
the manner and to the extent specified in such order. The order shall
contain such information as the Secretary may describe concerning any
transaction in which such financial institution is involved for the
payment, receipt, or transfer of United States coins or currency (or such
other monetary instruments as the Secretary may describe in such order)
the total amounts or denominations of which are equal to or greater than
an amount which the Secretary may prescribe.8 5
The new SAR replaced the Criminal Referral Form, 6 long the
subject of complaints from financial institutions because of its length,
complexity, and the requirement that the financial institution file the form
with the regulator, the local United States Attorney, the FBI, the Secret
84 31 U.S.C. § 5318(h) (1994) (authorizing anti-money laundering programs
and reporting compliance programs including guidance on required policies,
compliance officers, training programs, and independent audit procedures).
85 31 C.F.R. § 103.26(a) (1995) (emphasis added).
86 60 Fed. Reg. 46,556 (1995) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. § 103)
(proposing new 31 C.F.R. § 103.21, moving old § 103.21 to § 103.20, and
providing instructions on SAR); 60 Fed. Reg. 47,719 (1995) (to be codified at
12 C.F.R. § 353) (providing FDIC regulations relating to SAR); PRESS RELEASE,
FEDERAL RESERVE, June 28, 1995 (announcing proposed rule changes to 12
C.F.R. §§ 208, 211, 225) (providing FED regulations relating to SAR).
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Service, and the IRS. 7 The SAR purportedly will take less time to
complete, 8 and financial institutions need file it only with FinCEN. 9
Banks, savings and loans, credit unions, bank holding companies, and
branches of foreign banks in the United States must file the SAR.9'
Normally, after detecting criminal or suspicious activity, the institution
has thirty days to file the SAR, but the bank must immediately make a
telephone report to appropriate law enforcement officials in cases of an
on-going suspected violation.9' The financial institution must report
suspicious transactions involving $5,000 or more if the institution can
identify the suspect92 and $25,000 or more if the institution has "no
basis for identifying a possible suspect."'93 The bank must report any
transaction involving the bank which it "knows, suspects, or has reason
to suspect"94 involves illegal proceeds or an attempt to hide or disguise
illegal proceeds, 9 an attempt to evade any money laundering statute
including the reporting requirements, 96 or a transaction with no
legitimate business purpose or "reasonable explanation."'97
The SAR must contain information about the reporting financial
institution,98 the subject of the SAR,9 9 the suspicious activity it-
87 John J. Byrne, Preparing for the Upcoming Suspicious Activity Report,
MONEY LAUNDERING L. REP., Oct. 1995, at 1, 5 (analyzing the merits of the
new SAR).
88 Suspicious Activity Report, 6 BANKERS' HOTLINE 1 (1995) (estimating
that the new SAR will take only 40 minutes to complete) [hereinafter Suspicious
Activity].
89 Id.
90 See infra app. at SAR Instruction 1.
91 Suspicious Activity, supra note 88. See infra app. at Instructions.
92 Suspicious Activity, supra note 88. See infra app. at Instruction 1.b.
93 Suspicious Activity, supra note 88. See infra app. at Instruction I.c.
94 Suspicious Activity, supra note 88. See infra app. at Instruction 1.d.
95 Suspicious Activity, supra note 88. See infra app. at Instruction 1.d.i.
96 Suspicious Activity, supra note 88. See infra app. at Instruction 1.d.ii.
97 Suspicious Activity, supra note 88. See infra app. at Instruction 1.d.iii.
98 Suspicious Activity, supra note 88. See infra app. at Part 1, p.680. The
requirements include the institution's name, address, asset size, federal regulator,
the accounts involved, and whether the institution has closed the accounts in
question. See infra app. at Part 1, p. 680 .
99 Suspicious Activity, supra note 88. See infra app. at Part II, p.680. These
requirements include the suspect's name, address, social security number, phone
numbers, occupation, form of ID, relationship to bank, status of relationship to
bank, and whether the suspect made an admission or confession to the bank. See
infra app. at Part II, p.680.
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self,"' ° any witnesses to the conduct, the preparer of the SAR, the
contact at the bank,' and finally, a detailed explanation of the
suspicious activity.' °2 Notably, this final requirement not only imposes a
considerable investigatory duty on the bank, it also requires the reporting
bank to exercise significant discretion in recommending further
investigation." 3
While the SAR stops short of delegating law enforcement authority
to the bank, it does seems to grant a form of prosecutorial or
investigatory discretion. FinCEN tactfully describes certain situations as
requiring "more involved judgment... extend[ing] to whether the facts
and circumstances and the institution's knowledge of its customer provide
a reasonable explanation for the transaction that removes it from the
suspicious category."' 4 Furthermore, the form not only requires the bank
to report all conduct of a certain type,'03 rather the SAR. directs the bank
to actively encourage or discourage further investigation by federal law
enforcement."10
In response to a concern by financial institutions that they lack
sufficient guidance to complete the SAR, FinCEN specifically identifies
'(o Suspicious Activity, supra note 88. See infra app. at Part III, p.681. These
requirements include the date of the transaction/conduct, the amount involved,
the bank's characterization of the suspicious conduct (choices include reporting,
structuring, money laundering, check fraud, loan fraud, counterfeiting, credit card
fraud, embezzlement, false statement, wire transfer fraud, and self-dealing), the
amount of recovery or loss, whether the conduct had a material effect on the
financial soundness of the bank, and whether and how the bank advised law
enforcement. See infra app. at Part III, p.681.
1o, Suspicious Activity, supra note 88. See infra app. at Parts IV-VI, p.681.
102 Suspicious Activity, supra note 88. See infra app. at Part VII, p.682. The
requirements include "a chronological and complete account of the possible
violation of law, including what is unusual, irregular or suspicious about the
transaction." The directions note: "This section of the referral is critical. The care
with which it is written may make the difference in whether or not the described
conduct and its possible criminal nature are clearly understood." See infra app.
at Part VII, p.682.
103 Suspicious Activity, supra note 88. See infra app. at Part VII, i, p.682
(directing the bank to "[r]ecommend any further investigation that might assist
law enforcement authorities").
'0461 Fed. Reg. 4326, 4329 (1996) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. part 103).
1o5 Suspicious Activity, supra note 88, 1 app. at Part VII, p.3. See infra app.
at Part VII, p.682.
1's Suspicious Activity, supra note 88, 1 app. at Part VII, p.3. See infra app.
at Part VII, p.682.
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three examples in which a bank may need to use "more involved
judgment" to decide if a transaction qualifies as suspicious: fund transfers
not commensurate with the "stated business or activity" of the customer,
fund transfers without normal identifying information or transfers made
so as to "disguise the country of origin or destination or identity" of the
recipient; and the frequent use of an account as a "temporary resting
place for funds from multiple sources without a clear business
purpose."' 7 In addition to the guidance from the government, a number
of private analysts, including Michael Zeldin, the former chief of the
Department of Justice Money Laundering Office, have prepared lists of
suspicious activities."'
'07 Major New Suspicious Activity, supra note 10, at 4.
108 E.g., Michael Zeldin, Money Laundering Compliance: MoneyLaundering
Red Flags, DECISION STRATEGIES INT'L J., Sept. 1995, at 2 (discussing the
"generic signals to which all financial institutions, trades and businesses should
be attuned to defeat money laundering"). The list includes (1) loans to offshore
companies with no apparent connection to the customer's business, (2) unusually
frequent and/or large cash transactions given the nature of the customer's
business, (3) large cash transactions by the customer with other banks without the
use of an armored carrier, (4) frequent and/or large wire transfers by the
customer to banks offshore, (5) loans to the customer secured by obligations to
offshore banks, (6) a customer with an established relationship to bank secrecy
haven countries, (7) frequent and/or large wire transfers for persons with no
normal customer relationship with bank, (8) brokered deposits in which the
broker's fee is paid from a related loan, (9) loan production or sales used as basis
for bonuses to officers, (10) solicitations by people who claim to have large
amounts of money from a confidential source available for deposit or loan,
especially if the solicitor quotes a rate below the normal market rate, (11) a
customer whose financial statements lack verification by an audit that supports
the stated value of the customer's company, (12) loan proceeds used for purposes
other than that recorded, (13) attempts by customers to use cash to complete a
transaction normally handled by check, (14) attempts by customers to use third-
party instruments to complete the transaction, (15) a customer who appears more
concerned with cancellation privileges than with performance or interest rate of
investment, (16) reluctanceby a customer to provide adequate identification, (17)
purchases apparently beyond the customer's means, (18) customers with
residence or place of business distant from the bank, if the bank has a branch
closer to the customer's residence or place of business, (19) a customer whose
financial statement appears inconsistent with similar customers and whose
financial statement is not prepared by an accountant, and (20) customers with
backgrounds inconsistent with their purported business or purchase.
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The Treasury Department has also urged that banks adopt "know your
customer programs."' 9 These programs serve two functions: the
program may allow banks to apply for exemptions from certain reporting
requirements," 0 and know your customer programs may aid in the
identification of suspicious and criminal activity."' In general, know
your customer programs are designed to detect unusual, and therefore
possibly illegal, transactions. One training program provided a list of
suspicious body language and behavior (fidgeting, discomfort, hesitation,
repetition, covering mouth, bouncing, nervousness, hurried, overly
friendly, asking wrong questions) for which account executives should
watch when opening new accounts." 2 On the basis of this behavior, the
article recommended that the account executive should "[a]lert your
tellers, AND someone in bookkeeping to keep an eye on the account and
to alert you to any unusual activity. Put the account on referral for a few
weeks, so that you can keep your eye on it.""' 3 Know your customer
programs, however, cannot substitute for specific inquiry after the
detection of an unusual transaction. The bottom line is that "[b]anks
should never make criminal referrals without conducting a sufficient
investigation to determine that there is in fact a reasonable basis to
believe criminal activity is indicated."'
1 4
V. POLITICS AND POLIcY BEHIND THE SAR
The SAR delegates almost prosecutorial discretion to the reporting
bank to interpret the law, analyze conduct, describe the elements of
conduct constituting a possible offense, and to suggest future
investigation.' Roger Weiner, chief of the enforcement section at
FinCEN, explained that the breadth and vagueness of the SAR reflected
109 See New Accounts: Know Your Customer, 6 BANKERS' HOTLINE 1, 4
(1995) (providing guidelines for banks in verifying customer information).
"o See 31 U.S.C. § 5313 (1994) (defining the mandatory and discretionary
exemptions from domestic coin and currency transaction reporting requirements
available to financial institutions).
.. New Accounts: Know Your Customer, supra note 109, at 4.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Whitney Adams, Effective Strategies for Banks in Avoiding Criminal,
Civil, andForfeitureLiability in Money Laundering Cases, 44 ALA. L. REV. 669,
700 (1993).
5 See Suspicious Activity, supra note 88, at 1 app. at Part VII, p.3.
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a "wait-and-see approach" on FinCEN's part. 16 Weiner stated that
FinCEN expected to receive approximately 100,000 SARs per year"7
and that such a large number of referrals would provide the agency with
information to expand the SAR instructions and to provide greater
guidance for the reporting banks." 8 Once FinCEN reaches a level of
confidence with the SAR, it will expand the reporting requirements from
banks to non-bank financial institutions (e.g., brokers) who will most
likely face the same SAR reporting requirements as banks.'19
Banks have complained since the beginning of the criminal referral
regime about the paperwork and reporting burden created by the
forms.' Estimates place the cost per report at approximately $8.00 for
each of the referrals filed in 1994.21 Banks expressed satisfaction that
FinCEN alone would receive the SAR, rather than the several agencies
that received the earlier referral. 22 This change reflects legislative
concern for the burden imposed on the financial system." In order to
address this burden, Congress provided that to the "extent practicable and
appropriate" the suspicious activity report shall be sent to a single
designee.
24
That single designee, FinCEN, has been at the center of intense
debate since its creation. Privacy advocates raise grave concerns over the
16 Telephone Interview withRoger Weiner, Head of Enforcement, FinCEN
(Oct. 1, 1995).
117 Id. A comparison of this estimate to the number of currency transaction
reports marked suspicious under the old reporting system may prove illuminating.
During the first six months of 1995, banks made a record 5.7 million currency
transaction reports. CTR's Peak As FinCEN Ponders "Exemptions", MONEY
LAUNDERING ALERT (Alert Int'l, Inc.), Sept. 1, 1995, at 3. Historically, banks
marked approximately 0.5% of all such reports as suspicious. Profile of
Suspicious Transaction Reporting in the U.S. in 1993, MONEY LAUNDERING
ALERT (Alert Int'l, Inc.), May 1, 1995, at 8. Assuming banks file an SAR for
each form they previously marked as a suspicious cash transaction, Weiner's
estimate seems impossibly low. His estimateseems commensurate, however, with
the number of criminal referral forms (the predecessor of the SAR) that banks
have historically filed. In 1993, banks filed just over 80,000 criminal referral
forms, of which some 13,000 involved a suspicion of money laundering. Id.
". Telephone Interview with Roger Weiner, supra note 116.
"9 Major New Suspicious Activity, supra note 10, at 1.
120 Byrne, supra note 87, at 5.
121 Id.
122 id.
123 id. at 1.
124 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g)(4) (1994).
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centralization of financial information at FinCEN which is connected to
most of the federal government's databases in order to create a single,
coordinated database for financial crime enforcement. 5 FinCEN has
information-sharing agreements with most federal agencies charged with
financial law enforcement responsibilities.2 6 Critics worry that FinCEN
has ushered in the age of "Big Brotherism" and government computer
surveillance of personal finances.'27 Feeding the fears of the critics are
proposals such as the one introduced by the Clinton Administration
following the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing. The Administration included
a proposal in the Antiterrorism Act to allow FinCEN to obtain additional
financial information, including credit card data.1
28
The critics of FinCEN find ammunition in proposals like the plan
announced by the Office of Technology Assessment in 1994 to develop
a FinCEN computer program capable of generating automated subpoenas
for bank records. 9 The proposal envisioned a computer program that
would examine currency transaction reports and SARs, detect probable
crimes, issue an electronic subpoena, and then automatically access bank
records to investigate. 30 After a feasibility study, OTA scrapped the
plan because of technical obstacles.'
On the other side of the debate, the supporters of FinCEN foresee the
organization playing a significant role in thwarting high-profile financial
crime and in detecting incipient terrorist activity by tracking the flow of
terror-dollars.'32 For instance, the agency played a key role in the
investigation leading to the 1994 arrest of high-ranking CIA employee
'2 Major New Suspicious Activity, supra note 10, at 4.
26 Institutions Given Conflicting Advice on New Compliance Duties, MONEY
LAUNDERING ALERT (Alert Int'l, Inc.), Sept. 1995, at 5.
127 See Stephen A. Bercu, Toward Universal Surveillance in an Information
Age Economy: Can We Handle Treasury's New Police Technology?, 34
JuRIMETRics J. 383, 428-33 (1994); Matthew N. Kleiman, Comment, The Right
to Financial Privacy Versus ComputerizedLaw Enforcement: A New Fight in an
Old Battle, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 1169, 1172-74 (1992).
128 Peter N. Spotts, Why the Feds Want Access to Credit Records, CHRISTIAN
Sci. MONITOR, May 5, 1995, at 1.




'31 ComputerAnti-MoneyLaunderingPlan Shelved, MONEY LAUNDERING L.
REP., Oct. 1995, at 3.
132 See infra notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
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and Soviet/Russian double agent Aldrich Ames.133 In 1993, FinCEN's
analysis of a single suspicious transaction report from Citibank resulted
in the prosecution of twenty-three members of an international money
laundering conspiracy and the identification of between $70 and $100
million in illegal drug proceeds deposited at a single Swiss bank.'
Also in 1993, FinCEN identified accounts and conduits of terrorist
funding by following leads unearthed during the investigation into the
World Trade Center bombing. ' During the 1991 Gulf War, the agency
helped identify Iraqi assets in the United States. Using records seized
during the 1989 invasion of Panama, the agency located numerous
accounts belonging to drug cartels. 36
In addition to debate about the proper role of FinCEN, the very idea
of a duty to report crime incites debate. Advocates of reporting argue that
it helps develop morality and builds a communitarian response to
crime.'37 Critics of imposing reporting duties cite a range of concerns
including general distaste for informants, the prospect for retaliation, the
inconvenience of becoming a witness in a lawsuit, doubts about the
efficacy of reporting, and lack of moral compulsion to report.'38 Other
analysts note a hostility toward tipping the scales in an adversarial system
and a concern that a duty to report would undermine public respect for
the justice system.'39
A more focused criticism of the duties imposed by the BSA notes
that banks merely follow the lead of federal bank regulators. 4 This
... FinCEN began the investigation of Ames after at least one bank reported
Ames for a suspicious cash deposit - apparently a portion of his payments from
the Soviets. Spy Case Highlights BSA Compliance, THRIFT REGULATOR, Apr. 11,
1994, at 4 [hereinafter Spy Case]. FinCEN subsequently began to investigate
inexplicable "surges" in accounts of other high-ranking officials of the FBI and
CIA. Id. For a description of troubling implications regarding bank compliance
arising out of the Ames investigation, see infra note 139 and accompanying text.
134 Bank STR Exposes Worldwide Money Laundering Operation, MONEY
LAUNDERING ALERT (Alert Int'l, Inc.), Dec. 1, 1994, at 6.
"' Information Tech. and Financial Data Nab Criminals for High-Tech
Agency, TACTICAL TECH., Mar. 16, 1994, at 1.
136 Id.
13' Bucy, supra note 29, at 847-50.
138 Lynch, supra note 4, at 528-35.
13' Sarah N. Welling, Corporate Officers' Duty to Report Criminal
Wrongdoing by the Corporation: A Study of American Law, Seminar at the
Eighth International Conference of the Society for the Reform of Criminal Law:
The Corporation and the Criminal Law, Victim and Violator, Dec. 4-8, 1994.
140 This argument is advanced in John K. Villa, A Critical View of Bank
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line of argument contends that the penalties and prosecutions in the late
1980s' correlated with an abrupt shift from little emphasis on the
reporting of potentially criminal conduct to a sudden commitment to full
reporting. According to this school of thought, banks complied with the
BSA only marginally during the mid 1980s.'42 Their compliance
improved dramatically during the late 1980s, but this change came about
not because of the lawsuits and penalties but rather because of increased
emphasis on reporting by bank regulators.'43 The core of the argument
is that banks would voluntarily report criminal conduct if bank regulators
emphasized the importance of such reports.'" In other words, banks
would report as necessary without a general statutory duty.
By imposing a duty to report criminal conduct, the government hopes
to improve the social order and achieve greater peace and safety. 4
Ultimately, in order to evaluate the suspicious activity report, society
must weigh the potential benefit of crime reduction against the certain
decrease in financial privacy. In a more narrow sense, however, the SAR
succeeds if it reduces financial crime and helps to purge the banking
system of that crime.'46
Measuring the success of the SAR may prove difficult because of
doubts about the extent of compliance. Even if the filing of SARs leads
to the prosecution of criminals, questions remain about whether banks
will competently report suspicious activity. Skepticism about the efficacy
of suspicious transaction reporting requirements is dramatically portrayed
by FinCEN's investigation of CIA employee and Soviet/Russian double
agent Aldrich Ames. While the banks at which Ames had accounts did
report large cash deposits as required, those banks often did not tag the
reports as suspicious.147 This incident engenders grave concerns about
how many other suspicious transactions go unreported.
41
Secrecy Act Enforcement and the Money Laundering Statutes, 37 CATH. U. L.





145 Yeager, supra note 4, at 38.
146 For a general analysis of the limited success of reporting requirements,
see John J. Byrne, The Bank Secrecy Act: Do Reporting Requirements Really
Assist the Government, 44 ALA. L. REv. 801 (1993).
"41 Spy Case, supra note 133, at 4.
141 Id. The Ames case also illustrates the crucial importance of know your
customer programs that, theoretically, should allow banks to detect unusual
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Perhaps more importantly, however, a recent Government Accounting
Office report suggests that law enforcement agencies themselves may not
respond to the suspicious transactions that banks do report.'49 The GAO
scathingly criticized the IRS and other agencies for allowing reports to
accumulate without investigation and for failing to provide adequate
supervision over the disposition of suspicious transaction reports.Y In
response to these criticisms, the IRS Criminal Investigation Division
issued new guidelines for handling reports of suspicious transactions, but
these rules mandate an investigation only if the same individual is the
subject of five or more reports in a twelve month period.1
5'
FinCEN itself faces similar criticism and a complementary loss of
financial support from within the government. 5 1 This frustration stems
from delays in obtaining analysis of suspicious activity from FinCEN
staff s'5 In response, other agencies have returned to in-house analysis:
Agents have complained that their work is often "time sensitive"
and cannot afford to wait the time it normally takes FinCEN to submit
its [research] findings. Some complain that FinCEN analyses provide
little new information that they did not already know. The result of the
disenchantment has been a decline in the number of requests for
assistance that federal agencies submit.'54




While critics of FinCEN and opponents of reporting focus their
energy on public policy issues and debate the effectiveness of the
account activity such as Ames' illegitimate cash deposits.
"49 GAO Sheds First Light on Suspicious Transaction Reporting, MONEY
LAUNDERING ALERT (Alert Int'l, Inc.), May 1, 1995, at 1; Profile of Suspicious
Transaction Reporting in the U.S. in 1993, MONEY LAUNDERING ALERT (Alert
Int'l, Inc.), May 1, 1995, at 8.
150 Id.
' ' IRS CID Implements New Field Suspicious Activity Guidelines, MONEY
LAUNDERING ALERT (Alert Int'l, Inc.), Oct. 1 1995, at 3.
152 Justice, Treasury Forfeiture Funds Cut Off FinCEN Support, MONEY
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reporting regime, the banks continue to express concern regarding the
extent of their liability under the SAR. Generally, this liability includes
liability to customers for filing the SAR, liability to customers for
terminating accounts after filing an SAR, liability to the government for
failure to file the SAR, and liability to the government based on the
bank's participation in the conduct described in the SAR.5 6
The safe harbor provision of 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g)(3) clearly shields
the bank from liability to the bank customer for statements made in the
SAR, but this provision does not address potential liability for terminating
an account based on unfounded suspicions. The safe harbor provision also
neglects to address liability for a report that fails to comply with the
standards established by the reporting requirements.
Banks must weigh carefully the danger of terminating accounts
without cause after Ricci v. Key Bancshares, Inc.,"5 7 in which the court
penalized a bank for wrongfully terminating an account after filing an
inaccurate criminal referral under the old reporting system.'58 The
dilemma comes into sharper focus with the understanding that if a bank
knowingly continues its relationship with a criminal customer, the bank
itself may face liability under the money laundering laws for involving
a financial institution in a transaction that involves criminal proceeds.' 59
Often Federal officials request that a bank not terminate an account so
that they can monitor the suspect's activities, but to make the dilemma
even more difficult, federal officials often have failed to respond to
suspicious transaction reports and criminal referrals, leaving the bank
without a clear path to follow. 60
,56 For an analysis of the potential liability of banks and proposed solutions,
see generally Adams, supra note 114.
157 662 F. Supp. 1132, 1137-38 (D. Me. 1987). See also Maine Bank
Penalizedfor Heeding Rumors of Organized Crime Link, AM. BANKER, Apr. 30
1987, at 7 (describing Ricci v. Key Bancshares, Inc., in which two businessmen
were awarded $15 million after a bank cut off their credit based on erroneous
information linking one of them to organized crime).
"I Ricci, 662 F. Supp. at 1137-38.
159 See 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (1994). In addition, a bank may face forfeiture of
property involved in a money laundering offense under 18 U.S.C. § 981 (civil
forfeiture) or under 18 U.S.C. § 982 (criminal forfeiture).
160 Attorneys advising banks making reports must give delicate advice on
when to terminate an account and how to report the bank's involvement in the
suspicious transaction. This advice must take into account the benefits of self-
reporting under the DOJ leniency policy and under the Sentencing Guidelines as
described supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text. One commentator goes so
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Despite the ambiguous language of the safe harbor provisions,
Congress intended that the section should eliminate the problem caused
by Ricci. As the legislative history reveals:
In many cases, after a suspicion has been reported, Federal
authorities will encourage financial institutions to continue dealing with
a suspicious customer so his activities may be monitored. Unfortunately,
in other cases, law enforcement authorities do not always follow-up
with financial institutions on the disposition of suspicious activity
reports. In any event, financial institutions should be free to sever
relations with the customer based on their suspicions or on information
about a customer received from law enforcement. 6'
In Young v. Chemical Bank, 16 a customer brought suit on the
grounds that the bank violated customer privacy by failing to follow
proper procedures for reporting suspicious activity." The plaintiff
argued that the improper reporting precluded the bank from availing itself
of any safe harbor provision."6 The suit claimed that, in 1986, officials
at Chemical Bank notified police in Bermuda who then involved the
Justice Department in order to subpoena records from Chemical
Bank.' 65 In 1989, the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a related
portion of the suit brought under the Right to Financial Privacy Act
("RFPA"),166 but the court abstained from ruling on questions of state
far as to describe banks as "sitting ducks" for prosecution if they continue their
relationship with a customer after an SAR. This same analyst has suggested that
banks contact the government before termination, and obtain confirmation in
writing if the government requests that the bank maintain the account in order
to gather more information and to avoid alerting the customer. Adams, supra
note 114, at 700-01.
161 137 CONG. REC. S16,640-01, S16,647 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1991)
(statement of Sen. D'Amato (R-N.Y.) regarding amendments to BSA).
162 The suit began in federal court as a suit against the Department of Justice
and Chemical Bank under the Right to Financial Privacy Act. See Young v.
United States, 882 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that government authorities
had not violated depositor's rights under the Act). Eventually, the suit appeared
in New York state court as a suit against Chemical Bank alone under New York
common law governing bank-depositor relations. See Young v. Chemical Bank,
N.Y. L.J., Aug. 7, 1992, at 21, 21-22.
163 Young v. Chemical Bank, supra note 162, at 22.
164 Id.
165 id.66 Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 ("RFPA), Pub. L. 95-630, 92
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law governing bank-depositor relations.167 A New York lower court
ruled, in 1992, that the bank faced liability for violating its duties of
confidentiality to its customer. '68 While Young does not seem to pose
any challenge for the SAR, 16 9 the case does dramatically highlight the
crucial importance of proper oversight and compliance programs, as well
as the limits of the safe harbor provisions. The case also illustrates the
unpredictability of interactions between federal statutes and state common
law.
Young also suggests the possibility that banks may face liability if
they follow the reporting guidelines in all regards except that they
voluntarily report suspicious activity below the threshold established by
the SAR. The SAR requires reporting of suspected offenses above the
$5000/$25,000 threshold; 70 therefore, the safe harbor protection applies
to those reports. The question is whether the safe harbor provision would
protect voluntary reports of suspicious conduct that falls below the
threshold level. The American Banking Association believes that the safe
harbor would apply to both mandatory and voluntary reports."'
In contrast to Young, a bank recently won a decisive victory in a suit
in federal court in Texas based on alleged violations of the RFPA.
Velasquez-Campuzano v. Marfa National Bank 72 arose before the
passage of the Annunzio-Wylie safe harbor provision, but in a summary
Stat. 3697 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
167 Young v. United States, 882 F.2d 633, 644-45 (2d Cir. 1989).
168 See, e.g., NY. Court Case Raises Some Surprise Questions on Issue of
Reporting Suspicious Transactions, REG. COMPLIANCE WATCH, Jan. 11, 1993,
at 3 (analyzing the effect of Justice Harold Baer's ruling in Young v. Chemical
Bank). Following Justice Baer's decision, Chemical moved to reargue and
subsequently obtained a dismissal of the complaint. Young v. Chemical Bank,
N.Y. L.J., Apr. 21, 1993, at 21, 21-22. In the second action, the court held that
public policy considerations and the need to deter money laundering overrode
considerations of customer confidentiality. After the second Young case it seems
doubtful that a bank would face liability in New York under common law
confidentiality requirements. For an analysis of Young and of other states'
approaches to the confidentiality issue, see Richard A. Spehr, Duty of Customer
Confidentiality Unclear, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 29, 1993, at 17.
169 The firm of Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue has cautioned its clients,
however, that the ruling does seem to place banks between the Scylla of federal
reporting requirements and the Charybdis of New York's common law which
requires confidentiality. Id.
70 See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
171 Byrne, supra note 87, at 1.
172 896 F. Supp. 1415 (W.D. Tex. 1995).
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judgement, the court ruled that, even without that specific protection, the
RFPA provided no cause of action based on the proper filing of a
currency transaction report.'73 The court also rejected a claim that the
bank had violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights to privacy, noting
that, even if the plaintiffs had such a claim, the courts would have to
balance privacy interests against compelling law enforcement
concerns. 74 Most importantly, in contrast to the Young case, the court
explicitly rejected any claim arising under state common law.
75
A bank probably cannot avoid civil lawsuits, whether frivolous or
valid, by disgruntled customers who allege violations of their rights to
confidentiality and privacy. Action by the government for failure to
report, on the other hand, would damage a bank far more. 76 When the
government pursues a lawsuit for failure to file required reports, it may
opt for either a civil 77 or criminal178 suit. Since FinCEN took over
enforcement duties, the government has tended toward civil settlements
rather than lawsuits. 79 Roger Weiner anticipated that the general
preference for civil settlements over lawsuits would continue, although he
expected to handle a small number of court cases each year. 80 In
addition to liability for the banks, the government may also proceed
against bank officials personally for causing a bank to fail to file required
reports. 181
During the late 1980s, the government underscored the seriousness of
reporting requirements by penalizing over forty banks for violations.'82
For instance, the Bank of America paid a $4.75 million civil penalty;
Crocker National paid a $2.25 million civil penalty; and the Bank of
Boston faced a $500,000 penalty.'83 All of these penalties arose from
7 Id. at 1424.
174Id.
17 Id. at 1425-27.
176 Adams, supra note 114, at 669; Villa, supra note 140, at 508.
177 31 U.S.C. § 5321 (1994).
178 Id. § 5322.
'79 E.g., FinCEN Settles Two BSA Citations, THRIFT REGULATOR, May 29,
1995, at 5 (detailing settlement agreements with Sacramento First National Bank
of California ($20,000 civil money penalty) and Metropolitan Bank and Trust
Co. of Guam ($6,000 civil money penalty)).
180 Telephone Interview with Roger Weiner, Chief of Enforcement, FinCEN
(Oct. 1, 1995).
18 E.g., United States v. Heyman, 794 F.2d 788, 791 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 989, 989 (1986).
182 Adams, supra note 114, at 675.
183Id. Dan Cordtz, Dirty Dollars, FIN. WORLD, Feb. 1, 1994, at 20
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large numbers of currency transaction report violations (e.g., 17,000
violations by the Bank of America)." 4 In 1992, the Treasury penalized
the First National Bank of Maryland $950,000 based on the failure to file
111 reports.18 The government has also penalized'casinos. For instance,
in 1992 the government aggressively pursued Atlantic City gaming
houses levying penalties totaling $2.5 million.'86
The government rarely prosecutes banks for failure to report. Before
FinCEN took charge, only one reported case suggested that banks might
face prosecution for failure to file a suspicious transaction report."8 7
Perhaps the most notable criminal prosecution under the reporting
requirements is United States v. Bank of New England, a case that
revolved around a bank's failure to file currency transaction reports.88
Two crucial legal doctrines that facilitate the prosecution of banks for
failure to report arose out of Bank of New England (1) willful blindness
satisfies the mens rea requirement for a violation of reporting duties, and
(2) the collective knowledge of employees provides sufficient knowledge
for a willful violation.'89 The bank had argued that its violation did not
rise to the level of willfulness as required by the statute. 9 ' The First
Circuit ruled that the bank had the requisite mental state if the bank
deliberately avoided learning about the reporting requirements.' 9' The
court further stated that the government could prove knowledge of the
reporting requirements either by establishing actual knowledge by an
employee or by aggregating the partial knowledge of several employees
under a theory of collective knowledge.'92 In either case, the
(explaining the government crackdown on banks that fail to file the required
reports).
'84 Adams, supra note 114, at 675.
185Id. (discussing the rise in the dollar value of the civil penalty per
violation).
186 Caesar's Casino Pays $57, OO BSA Penalty, MONEY LAUNDERING ALERT
(Alert Int'l, Inc.), Jan. 1, 1995, at 5.
187 See United States v. L.B.S. Bank, 757 F. Supp. 496, 500 (E.D. Pa. 1990)
(describing indictrnent of bank for, among other offenses, failure to report
currency offenses).
188 821 F.2d 844, 857 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 943 (1987).
189 Id. at 854-57.
190 31 U.S.C. § 5322 (1994). See United States v. Hemando Ospina, 798 F.2d
1570, 1580 (1 1th Cir. 1986) (requiring "proof of the defendant's knowledge of
the reporting requirement and his specific intent to commit the crime").
191 Bank of New England, 821 F.2d at 855.
192 Id. at 855-56.
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government also needed to prove willfulness, or specific intent. 93 By
eliminating any mens rea defense, Bank of New England virtually
imposes strict liability on banks for compliance with currency transaction
reporting requirements.
194
The effects of government action to enforce the currency transaction
report do not have clear implications for the SAR. However, Bank ofNew
England certainly suggests that the government could employ the willful
blindness and collective knowledge theories in a prosecution for failure
to file an SAR.95 Under the willful blindness doctrine, a bank would
face liability if it turned a blind eye to suspicious conduct, or if it
negligently failed to establish an adequate know your customer program
or compliance program.'96 Similarly, the collective knowledge doctrine
would allow prosecutors to impute knowledge of suspicious conduct to
the bank even by piecing together, or aggregating, the fragmentary
knowledge of several employees.'97 In other words, if employee A
knew that based on the pattern of activity in the customer's account a
large cash deposit would be suspicious and employee B knew of a large
cash deposit, then the collective knowledge theory would require the bank
to file an SAR.
Banking analysts and commentators universally advocate know your
customer programs and compliance programs as the solutions to problems
of liability.'98 While the Treasury Department and the bank regulators
require and seek to audit compliance with reporting requirements,'99 the
government does not now provide specific guidance or requirements
regarding compliance or know your customer programs. The Treasury
Department, however, has scheduled for late 1996 the release of
directives on these programs designed to ensure compliance with the
SAR.200 The purpose of a know your customer program is to accurately
193 Id.
"' Villa, supra note 140, at 499-500 (comparing the standard established in
Bank of New England with the traditional jurisprudence for public safety
regulations).
195 Bank of New England, 821 F.2d at 854-57.
196 Id. at 854-55.
197 Id. at 855.
198 E.g., Adams, supra note 114, at 693-99; Razzano, supra note 51, at 297-
98.
99 E.g., 31 C.F.R. § 103.21(f) (proposed) (compliance with the SAR
requirement shall be audited by the Treasury).
200 60 Fed. Reg. 23,758 (1995) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. § 103) (Notice
of Proposed Rule Making on BSA compliance programs (including "procedures
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identify suspicious activity, while a compliance program ensures that all
suspicious activity is reported.20' Banks should also establish regular
communication with law enforcement authorities and should work to
ensure cooperation with the government. 2 2 Because government advice
and guidance on criminal activity often lags significantly behind cutting-
edge schemes, banks should also educate themselves on emerging patterns
of financial crime and the techniques by which they are implemented. 3
Furthermore, the regulations specifically note that a successful
compliance program has no effect on the liability of a bank for
facilitating a money laundering transaction. "Whether or not a bank
satisfies the requirements of this reporting rule has no direct bearing on
the obligations or possible liabilities of such bank or its directors,
officers, employees, or agents, under provisions of Title 18 of the United
States Code."2 4 Thus, despite a successful compliance program and
SAR filing, a bank may still face liability under the money laundering
laws for knowing involvement in an illegal financial transaction.
Filing an SAR does not shield a bank from criminal liability for
participation in money laundering. "Banks and their officers can be
criminally investigated, even when they initiated the inquiry with a
voluntary disclosure, and it is folly to rely on the assumption that the
government will reward them for being good corporate citizens after they
discover and report wrongdoing." 205 In fact, an SAR arguably might
document the bank's knowledge of its role in an illegal transaction and
preclude a mens rea defense in a criminal prosecution." 6 In several
instances, United States Attorneys have sought prosecution despite the
filing of proper reports. 07 For instance, a federal grand jury indicted
for BSA reporting and recordkeeping ... the designation of BSA compliance
officers and the establishment of training programs") and know your customer
programs (including specific guidance on the "identification and verification of
identity of account holders and beneficial owners, and customers conducting
significant business transactions and/or using safe deposit facilities, including
different identification and verification requirements for different categories of
customers")).
201 Id.
202 Adams, supra note 114, at 699-701.
203 Id. at 693.
204 60 Fed. Reg. 46,556, 46,562 (1995) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R.
103.21(f)).
205 Adams, supra note 114, at 700.
206 Villa, supra note 140, at 507.
207 See Norwest Probe Signals Tough New Theory, DOJ ALERT, Sept. 1992,
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two Texas bankers for money laundering despite complying with the
reporting requirements.20 8 While the trial court did dismiss the charges,
the bank admitted the responsibility of the officers and thus ended their
careers.2 9 In Montana, the United States Attorney prosecuted a banker
under the false statements statute210 based on an incomplete criminal
referral form filed on a suspicious transaction.2 ' The prosecutor argued
that the form falsified information because the banker failed to complete
the entire document.212 The SAR now features a prominent warning:
"Always complete entire report."213 In response to these prosecutions,
the DOJ has adopted prosecutorial guidelines requiring that United States
Attorneys receive approval from the Criminal Division in Washington,
D.C., before proceeding with prosecution of a bank under the money
laundering statutes.1 4
VII. AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECrIVE
ON MONEY LAUNDERING REPORTING OBLIGATIONS
Money launderers often move in international waters in order to
exploit discrepancies among the banking laws of different countries. t5
Their efforts to disguise the criminal origins of these funds rely on poor
communication and, particularly, on scant information-sharing across
national boundaries.216  The European experience illustrates the
combination of factors that make international money laundering so
successful. Europe has historically been home to strong bank secrecy and
privacy laws making investigation by law enforcement difficult. 217 The
at 4 [hereinafter Norwest Probe] (discussing the Norwest criminal indictment
following a criminal referral form completed by Norwest attorneys after a
Norwest branch suspected money laundering by one of its customers).
208 Id.
209 Id. at 5.
210 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1992).
21! Norwest Probe, supra note 207, at 4.
212 rd
213 See infra app. at p.680.
214 Money Laundering Guidelines to Protect Banks, DOJ ALERT, Nov. 1992,
at 2, 4.
215 See Jeffrey L. Quillen, The International Attack on Money Laundering:
European Initiatives, 1991 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 213, 214.
216 See Bruce Zagaris & Sheila M. Castilla, Constructing an International
Financial Enforcement Subregime: The Implementation of Anti-Money-
Laundering Policy, 19 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 871, 949 (1993).
217 Quillen, supra note 215, at 215.
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European Community has recently encouraged more liberal regulation of
banking and capital markets as part of the move toward European
economic union and in an effort to improve international
competitiveness." 8 Moreover, growing organized crime in Eastern
Europe has filtered into Western Europe following efforts to integrate the
East into the western economy." 9
To meet the challenge of international money laundering, several
international organizations and working groups have urged their member
countries to adopt laws requiring banks to report large currency
transactions and suspicious transactions. Several of the countries
attempting to impose a duty to report financial crime have, like the
United States, a history of ambivalent treatment of duties to report. For
instance, although English common law has historically subscribed to
misprision of felony,220 that offense appears extinct in modem
England.' Japan has a comparable history of requiring citizens to
report crime, but it also no longer legally imposes such a duty. 2
The international community has reached a remarkable consensus
about the importance of developing money laundering laws that include
suspicious transaction reporting duties generally similar to those in the
United States. The following international organizations have proposed
such statutory schemes: the United Nations; the Financial Action Task
Force ("FATF"), a twenty-six member group organized by the Group of
Seven industrial nations; the Basle Committee on Banking Regulation and
Supervisory Practices; the European Community; and the Organization of
American States.223
218 id.
219 LeylaBoulton, Russians "MoneyLaundering", FiN. TIMEs, July 14, 1994,
at 3 (describing the prevalence of money laundering by Russian criminals
through banks in the United Kingdom).
220 See, e.g., Sykes v. Director of Pub. Prosecutions, 1962 App. Cas. 528,
555 (H.L. 1961) ("Ever since the days of hue and cry, it has been the duty of a
man, who knows that a felony has been committed, to report it to the proper
authority so that steps can be taken to apprehend the felon and bring him to
justice.").
22 Lynch, supra note 4, at 518, 518 n.11l.
"During the Tokugawa era (1600-1868), members of the public bore
broad duty to assist investigative officials in reporting crimes." Daniel H. Foote,
The BenevolentPaternalism ofJapanese Criminal Justice, 80 CAL. L. REv. 317,
328 (1992). The government rewarded citizenswho reported and arrested serious
offenders, while it punished those who failed in their duty. Id. at 328 n.67.
22 For a description of international efforts to establish money laundering
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The FATF, for example, recommended that its members adopt laws
providing: "If financial institutions suspect that funds stem from a
criminal activity, they should be permitted or required to report promptly
their suspicions to the competent authorities. 224 Interestingly, the FATF
has urged that its members not only require suspicious transaction reports
of banks, but also of dealers in high value items such as jewelry, art,
antiques, and real estate.2 5 FATF has also advised that its members
establish, within their law enforcement organizations, a financial
intelligence unit, like FinCEN, with a centralized, computerized database
of information.226 Worldwide, seventeen countries have created such
agencies.
227
The European Community proposed that its members "ensure that
credit and financial institutions and their directors and employees
cooperate fully with the authorities responsible for combating money
laundering.., by informing those authorities, on their own initiative, of
any fact which might be an indication of money laundering.1
22
Individual European countries have greeted this directive with general
221opposition.  Sentiment often included fear of the expense and burden
of imposing a reporting duty and skepticism that such reports would
provide only minimal assistance to money laundering enforcement
efforts.230 The debate in Europe has revolved around many of the same
laws and for a description of the money laundering laws of individual countries,
see Duncan E. Alford, Anti-Money Laundering Regulations: A Burden on
Financial Institutions, 19 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 437 (1994); Lisa A.
Barbot, Money Laundering: An International Challenge, 3 TUL. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 161, 172-77 (1995); Zagaris & Castilla, supra note 216, at 882-906.
224 FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE REPORT § IIl(B)(3) (Recommendation
16) (Apr. 19, 1990), cited in Byme, supra note 146, at 834-35.
22 FATF Warns of Laundering through Securities, MONEY LAUNDERING
ALERT (Alert Int'l, Inc.), Aug. 1, 1995, at 1 (evaluating the provisions of the
FATF annual report for 1994-1995).
226 "Financial Intelligence Units" Proliferate Around World, MONEY
LAUNDERING ALERT (Alert Int'l, Inc.), Feb. 1, 1995, at 7 ("One of the FATF's
recommendations urges countries to institute 'a national central agency... for
use in money laundering cases."').
227 Id.
228 Council of the European Community Directive of 10 June 1991 on
prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money
laundering, 91/308/EEC, art. 6, available in WESTLAW, CELEX Database,
391L0308.
229 Quillen, supra note 215, at 226.
230 Id.
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issues causing consternation in this country. These issues include how to
draft a safe harbor provision as part of the suspicious transaction report
regulations, whether a bank should face liability for terminating an
account after reporting a suspicious transaction, whether the government
should prosecute a bank for involvement in money laundering even if it
diligently reports its involvement at the earliest opportunity, and whether
conviction for a reporting violation requires scienter.3
Australia possesses the most developed system of suspicious
transaction reporting and has required reports very similar to the SAR
since the passage of the Financial Transactions Reports Act of 1988.
The Act requires SUSTRs [suspicious transaction reports] to be
filed when there is a reasonable suspicion that information about a
transaction "may be relevant to investigation of, or prosecution of a
person for, an offense against a law of the Commonwealth or of a
Territory."
Those required to file the forms, which are banks, insurance
companies, securities dealers, casinos, bookmakers, bullion dealers, cash
carriers and sellers of traveler's checks and money orders, are given a
"safe harbor" from legal action [related to their reports]."
Australia also has the most advanced financial intelligence unit in the
world, the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Center
("AUSTRAC"). AUSTRAC has exactly the sort of access to financial
data dreaded by privacy advocates in the United States. The AUSTRAC
system does not rely exclusively on written reports; its computer
programs analyze huge numbers of innocent transactions in order to
discern suspicious patterns. 3 The suspicious activity reports merely
contribute to the investigatory efforts, rather then fueling them as in the
United States.234
In England, the law mandates suspicious transaction reports only if
the bank suspects a connection to terrorism; otherwise the law merely
permits suspicious transaction reporting without liability to the
customer.235 These reporting provisions went into effect in 1993, and
231 Id. at 227-28.
232 Australia 's A USTRAC Pioneers Tracking of Suspicious Activity, MONEY
LAUNDERING ALERT (Alert Int'l, Inc.), May 1, 1995, at 7 (citation omitted).
33 Id.
234 idF
25Qillen, supra note 215, at 227, 227 n.87. For a detailed description of
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the National Criminal Intelligence Service, Britain's financial intelligence
unit, expected to receive only five hundred reports annually.236 Instead,
it has received over 15,000 reports and faces criticism (similar to that
levelled at FinCEN and the IRS237) over its failure to respond to all the
information.238
In Switzerland, efforts to impose a reporting duty on Swiss banks,
most famous for their bank secrecy, have met with stiff resistance from
industry groups.239 Swiss law currently only addresses knowing partici-
pation in money laundering.240
In Hong Kong, a country with a reputation for money laundering,
the government has mandated suspicious transaction reporting since
1989.241 An appellate court ruling that those reports violated constitu-
tional confidentiality protections briefly interrupted the requirements until
Hong Kong's highest court reinstated the laws.242
The success of international money laundering efforts depends not
only on the adoption of laws, but also on international data-sharing from
reports of suspicious transactions and large currency transactions. 243
These efforts may face significant hurdles because many countries fear
the English statutes, see Scott E. Mortman, Note, Putting Starch in European
Efforts to Combat Money Laundering, 60 FORDHAM L. REv. S429, S447-52
(1992).
236 Top UK Crime Fighter Urges Creation ofLaundering TaskForce, MONEY
LAUNDERING ALERT (Alert Int'l, Inc.), June 1, 1995, at 7.
237 See supra notes 141-46 and accompanying text.
238 Jimmy Burns, MPs Urge MoneyLaundering Crackdown, FIN. TIMES, July
26, 1995, at 8; Top UK Crime Fighter, supra note 236, at 7.
239 Swiss Secrecy Laws Hinder Suspicious Activity Reporting, MONEY
LAUNDERING ALERT (Alert Int'l, Inc.), Feb. 1, 1995, at 7 (describing the
redrafting of an amendment to the Swiss money laundering law which would
have incorporated more stringent reporting requirements).
240 For a description of the voluntary and legal standards applicable to the
Swiss banking industry, see Rebecca G. Peters, Money Laundering and Its
Current Status in Switzerland: New Disincentivesfor Financial Tourism, 11 Nw.
J. INT'L L. & Bus. 104, 125-30 (1990).
241 Richard L. Holman, Money Laundering in Hong Kong, WALL ST. J., Oct.
25, 1995, at A9.
242 Hong Kong Regains Laundering Enforcement Authority, MONEY
LAUNDERING ALERT (Alert Int'l, Inc.), June 1, 1993, at 7.
243 See Zagaris & Castilla, supra note 216, at 953-62 (detailing the need for
international efforts to researchmoney laundering schemes, train law enforcement
officials, provide financial and technical assistance to less developed countries,
and establish international agreements for extradition).
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that requiring suspicious transaction reports will jeopardize the
international competitiveness of their banks.2'
International efforts with respect to suspicious transaction reporting
have several implications for the United States. First, they provide a
wider source of information on the successes and social consequences of
imposing a duty to report. Second, they may offer innovative solutions
to unanticipated or intractable problems. Third, the international
experience may offer clues to the directions in which reporting
requirements may grow in the future.
VIII. POTENTIAL GROWTH IN REPORTING DUTIES
An analysis of the likely growth areas for the duty to report suspected
money laundering may illustrate the direction of the emerging duty to
report criminal conduct. The most immediate prospect for growth is also
the most mundane. SARs or similar reports will soon be required245 of
non-bank financial institutions (e.g., brokers)246  and gambling
establishments.247 This area of growth will most likely have
ramifications for the development of gambling on the Ohio River and
could have future implications for the horse track and off-track betting
industry in Kentucky. Another industry ripe for regulation is the booming
business of check-cashing. Estimates place the number of such enterprises
at 4500 nationally.248 The fate of all such new regulation hinges
dramatically on the control and direction of Congress. Several Republican
members of Congress have pushed for a moratorium on new regulation
which, if passed, would halt the imposition of any new reporting
requirements.249
244Id. at 911.
245 60 Fed. Reg. 46,556, 46,559 (1995) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. part 103)
(explaining that current authority permits the Treasury Department to require
suspicious transaction reports from all financial institutions, not just banks, and
noting that "FinCEN intends to extend the obligation to report suspicious
transactions to such other institutions in the near future. However, [the new SAR
regulation] applies only to reporting of suspicious transactions by banks and other
depository institutions.").
246 While much discussion has surrounded these impending regulations, the
actual formulation of concrete rules has lagged behind the rhetoric. No New BSA
Rules in Sight for StockBrokers, MONEY LAUNDERING ALERT (Alert Int'l, Inc.),
Oct. 1, 1995, at 8.
247 Treasury Says More Casino Rules on the Way, MONEY LAUNDERING
ALERT (Alert Int'l, Inc.), Dec. 1, 1994, at 4.
248 Cordtz, supra note 183, at 20.
249 Looming BSA Rules Affected by GOP Bill Seeking "Time Outs ", MONEY
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In the long run, speculation about new money laundering laws and
concomitant reporting duties focuses on the information superhighway
and the danger of "cyberlaundering." 250 The danger of cyberlaundering
stems from the fact that no current regulations cover the operation of
cyberbanking.25' Cyberbanking appears most likely to grow on the
Internet and through smart cards (information age credit cards). 32
While the industry lacks structure, it has several attributes making it
particularly attractive to money launderers. Money launderers could
potentially use this industry to place, or deposit, illegally-obtained funds
into legitimate accounts.25 3 Electronic banking facilitates the process of
integrating illicit funds into the economy because the medium allows
parties to easily conceal their identities, to move funds instantaneously,
and to ignore national borders 4.25  Stanley Morris, the Director of
FinCEN has referred to the danger as one of "anonymous international
cash flows. 2 55 Money launderers could use multiple electronic
transactions and encryption to layer and mask transactions, thus thwarting
any effort to ascertain the source or owner of funds.256 The nature of
the electronic medium facilitates the money laundering process by
allowing cyberbanks to move their electronic locations (e.g., an Internet
site) easily and employ phantom addresses.257
The need for regulation of cyberbanking once again evokes the most
trenchant criticism of the current reporting scheme: the danger of Big
Brotherism and a massive government computer system that catalogs all
LAUNDERING ALERT (Alert Int'l, Inc.), Feb. 1, 1995, at 5.
250 See Citicorp Suffers First "Cyberheist" as Regulators Show Alarm,
MONEY LAUNDERING ALERT (Alert, Int'l, Inc.), Oct. 1, 1995, at 9 ("A federal
criminal complaint in Manhattan alleges that from his computer terminal in St.
Petersburg, Russia, the 28-year old [Vladimir] Levin broke into Citicorp's
sophisticated electronic wire transfer system, disguised himself as various banks
and illegally transferred $12 million from customer accounts to accounts he
controlled."); Ezra C. Levine, New Laundering Concerns: Safety in Cyberspace,
MONEY LAUNDERING L. REP., Oct. 1995, at 1, 1-3; U.S. Say's Cyber Banking
Vulnerable, L.A. DAILY NEWs, Sept. 28, 1995, at BI.
251 "Cyberlaundering" Poses Threat to Controls, MONEY LAUNDERING




255 Sarah J. Hughes, "Phantom" Cyberbanks Pose Laundering, Tax Evasion
Threat, MONEY LAUNDERING ALERT (Alert Int'l, Inc.), July 1, 1995, at 4.
256 "Cyberlaundering", supra note 251, at 1.
257 Hughes, supra note 255, at 4.
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financial transactions in order to weed out patterns of illegality. Unlike
in other areas in which the government and privacy conflict, in the area
of financial transactions in cyberspace, no legal roadblocks currently
prevent the free exercise of government regulation.
CONCLUSION
Perhaps the SAR makes banks uneasy because of concern for the
bottom line. There is a fear that the duty to report will hurt business
because the reporting requirements have transformed banks from dignified
institutions of caution and discretion that uphold the trust of their
customers into institutions that play an activist role in fighting crime and
that owe greater loyalty to the government than to their depositors."'
In other words, the SAR deputizes the bank, grants it prosecutorial
discretion, and cloaks its reports with immunity.259 Consumers of
financial services may not want to do business with banks that must act
as surrogates for law enforcement. A solution might be to give the
FinCEN increased access to financial records and then let the government
perform its own analysis. This solution, however, is fraught with the
perils of "Big Brotherism." It appears that the war on money laundering
presents society with a dilemma: expand the reporting of innocent
conduct and allow the government to extract evidence of illegality,
2 60
or delegate responsibility for detecting suspicious conduct to business.
The former sacrifices privacy and expands the power of the government
information bureaucracy, while the latter fundamentally alters the
relationship between bank and customer.
Viewed from one perspective, the mechanical reporting of innocent
conduct seems preferable. The SAR changes the role of business by
forcing banks to participate in the accusatorial process, while the currency
transaction reports engender far less anxiety despite the fact that they
overwhelmingly report the names of the innocent. On the other hand,
reporting innocent conduct occasions far greater concerns for privacy and
for the intrusion of government power. If fighting money laundering is
an imperative, society appears to have a choice: impose a duty upon
business to report illegality, or provide law enforcement with the
information necessary to perform the task of detecting money laundering.
Matthew R. Hall
25 See Adams, supra note 114, at 700; Alford, supra note 223, at 466-68.
259 Adams, supra note 114, at 700; Alford, supra note 223, at 466-68.






Suspicious FRB: FR 2230 OMB No.7100-0212
FDIC: 6710106 OMB No. 3064-0077
Activity Report oTs 0 0 OMN° 1560-0O0
NCUA: 2362 OMB No. 3133-0094
TREASURY: TO F 90-22.47 OMB No. 1506-0001
ALWAYS COMPLETE ENTIRE REPORT Expires September 30, 1998
1 Check appropriate box:
a El Initial Report b El Corrected Report c El Supplemental Report
' Reporting Financial Institution Information
2 Name of Financial Institution 3 Primary Federal Regulator
a El Federal Reserve d [] OCC
4 Address of Financial Institution b El FDIC a [] OTS
o Q1 NCUA
B City 6 State 7 ZipCodao 8 EIN or TIN
9 Address of Branch Officals) where activity occurred 10 Asset size of financial Institution
$ .00
11 City 12 State 13 Zip Code 14 If institution closed, date closed
IMMDDYY) ,
15 Account number(saeffected, if any 16 Have any of the institution's accounts related to this matter been closed?
a a 0] Yes b e6 No If yes, Identify
b
R B Suspect Information
17 Last Name or Name of Entity 18 First Name 19 Middle Initial
20 Address 21 SSN, SIN or TIN (as applicable
22 City 23 State 24 Zip Code 25 Country 26 Date of Birth (MMDDYY
I I I I I I - I -
27 Phone Number - Residence (include area code) 28 Phone Number - Work (include ama code)
( I I I I
29 Occupation
30 Forms of Identification for Suspect:
a El Driver'e License b El Passport c El Alien Registration d El Other
a Number f issuing Authority
31 Relationship to Financial Institution:
a [ Accountant d El Attomey g [] Customer j El Officer
b El Agent a E1 Borrower h El Director k El Shareholder
o [ Appralsr f El Broker 1 El Employee I El Other
32 Is insider suspect still affiliated with the financial institution? 33 Date of Suspension, 34 Admlssion/Confesson
a E Yes If n o, pcify El Suspended e E Resigned Termination Resigns- El Yes b El No
b El No. d El Terminated 
i / a
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i -ii Suspicious Activity Information
35 Date of suspicious activity (MMDDYY) 136 Dollar amount involved in known or suspicious activity
I /I $ .00
37 Summary characterization of auspicious activity-.
a El Bank Secrecy Act/Structuring/ g El Counterfeit Check m[ False Statement
Money Laundering h El Counterfeit Credit/Debit Card n [] Misuse of Position or
b El Bribery/Gratuity I El Counterfeit Instrument (other) Self-Dealing
c El Check Fraud j [ Credit Card Fraud o El Mortgage Loan Fraud
d El Check Kiting k El Debit Card Fraud p El Mysterious Disappearance
a El Commercial Loan Fraud I El Defalcation/Embezzlement q El Wire Transfer Fraud
fE Consumer Loan Fraud
r El Other
38 Amount of loss prior to recovery 139 Dollar amount of recovery 40 Has the auspicious activity had a
(if applicable) (if applicable) material impact on or otherwise affected
$ .00 41 .00 the financial soundness of the institution?
41 Has the Institution's bonding company been notified? a El Yes b El No
a E YEes b El No
42 Has arty law enforcement ag cy already been advised by telephone. written communication, or otherwise?
If ao, rut the agency and local address.
Agency
43 Address
44 City 45 State 46 Zip Code
V Wtness Information I a
47 Last Name 48 First Name 49 Middle Initial
60 Address 51 SSN
52 City 53 State 54 Zip Code 55 Date of Birth (MMDDYY)
56 Title I I 
I _ _
56 Tie [57 Phone Number linclude area code) 58 InterviewedI I a[lYes b[lNo
i Preparer Information
59 Last Name 60 First Name 61 Middle Initial
62 Title 63 Phone Number (include area code) 64 Date (MMDDYYjI I ) /._ I
i* iContact for Assistance (if different than Preparer Information in Part V)
65 Last Name 66 Rrst Name 67 Middle Initial
68 Ttle [69 Phone Number (include area code)
I A
70 Agency (Il applicable)
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1l Suspicious Activity Information Explanation/Description
Explanatiotidesclptlon of known or suspected violation of law or
suspicious activity. This section of the report is critical. The core
with which It is written may make the difference in whether or
not the described conduct and its possible criminal nature are
clearly understood. Provide below a chronological end complete
account of the possible Violation of law, including what is
unusual, irregular or suspicious about the transaction, using the
following checklist as you prepare your account. If necessary.
continue the narrative on a duplicate of this page.
a Dcribe supporting documentation and retain for 5 years.
b Explain who benefited, financially or otherwise, from the
transection, how much, and how.
o Retail any confession, admission, or explanation of the
transaction provided by the suspect and indicate to
whom and when it was given.
d Retain any confession, admission, or explanation of the
transection provided by any other person and Indicate
to whom and when it was given.
o Retain any evidence of cover-up or evidence of an attempt
to decoive federal or state examiners or others.
Indicate where the possible violation took place
le.g., main office, branch, other).
g Indicate whether the possible violation is an isolated
incident or relates to other transactions.
h Indicate whether there is any related litigation; if so,
specify.
I Recommend any further investigation that might assist law
enforcement authorities.
j Indicate whether any information has been excluded from
this report; if so, why?
For Bank Secrecy ActjStructuring/Money Laundering reports,
include the following additional information:
k Indicate whether currency and/or monetary instruments
were involved. if so, provide the amount and/or description.
I Indicate any account number that may be involved or
affected.
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Suspicious Activity Report
Instructions
Safe Harbor Federal law (31 U.S.C. 5318(g)(311 provides complete protection from civil liability for all reports of
suspected or known criminal violations and suspicious activities to appropriate authorities, Including supporting
documentation, regardless of whether such reports are filed pursuant to this report's instructions or are filed on a
voluntary basis. Specifically, the law provides that a financial institution, and its directors, officers, employees and
agents, that make a disclosure of any possible violation of law or regulation, including in connection with the
preparation of suspicious activity reports, 'shall not be liable to any person under any law or regulation of the United
States or any constitution, law, or regulation of any State or political subdivision thereof, for such disclosure or for
any failure to notify the person involved in the transaction or any other person of such disclosure."
Notification Prohibited Federal law (31 U.S.C. 5318(g)(21 requires that a financial institution, and its directors,
officers, employees and agents who, voluntarily or by means of a suspicious activity report, report suspected or
known criminal violations or suspicious activities may not notify any person involved in the transaction that the
transaction has been reported.
In situations Involving violations requiring Immediate attention, such as when a reportable violation is
ongoing, the financial Institution shall immediately notify, by telephone, appropriate law enforcement and
financial Institution supervisory authorities In addition to filing a timely suspicious activity report.
WHEN TO MAKE A REPORT:
1. All financial Institutions operating in the United States, including insured banks, savings associations,
savings association service corporations, credit unions, bank holding companies, nonbank subsidiaries of
bank holding companies, Edge and Agreement corporations, and U.S. branches and agencies of foreign
banks, are required to make this report following the discovery of:
a. Insider abuse Involving any amount. Whenever the financial institution detects any known or
suspected Federal criminal violation, or pattern of criminal violations, committed or attempted against
the financial institution or involving a transaction or transactions conducted through the financial
institution, where the financial institution believes that it was either an actual or potential victim of a
criminal violation, or series of criminal violations, or that the financial institution was used to facilitate
a criminal transaction, and the financial institution has a substantial basis for identifying one of its
directors, officers, employees, agents or other institution-affiliated parties as having committed or
aided In the commission of a criminal act regardless of the amount involved in the violation.
b. Violations aggregating $5,000 or more where a suspect can be identified. Whenever the financial
Institution detects any known or suspected Federal criminal violation, or pattern of criminal violations,
committed or attempted against the financial institution or involving a transaction or transactions
conducted through the financial institution and involving or aggregating $5,000 or more in funds or
other assets, where the financial institution believes that it was either an actual or potential victim of
a criminal violation, or series of criminal violations, or that the financial institution was used to
facilitate a criminal transaction, and the financial institution has a substantial basis for identifying a
possible suspect or group of suspects. If it is determined prior to filing this report that the identified
suspect or group of suspects has used an 'alias," then information regarding the true identity of the
suspect or group of suspects, as well as alias identifiers, such as drivers' licenses or social security
numbers, addresses and telephone numbers, must be reported.
c. Violations aggregating $25,000 or more regardless of a potential suspect. Whenever the financial
Institution detects any known or suspected Pederal criminal violation, or pattern of criminal violations,
committed or attempted against the financial institution or involving a transaction or transactions
conducted through the financial institution and involving or aggregating $25,000 or more in funds or
other assets, where the financial institution believes that it was either an actual or potential victim of
a criminal violation, or series of criminal violations, or that the financial institution was used to
facilitate a criminal transaction, even though there is no substantial basis for Identifying a possible
suspect or group of suspects.
d. Transactions aggregating $5,000 or more that Involve potential money laundering or violations of the
Bank Secrecy Act. Any transaction (which for purposes of this subsection means a deposit,
withdrawal, transfer between accounts, exchange of currency, loan, extension of credit, purchase or
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sale of any stock, bond, certificate of deposit, or other monetary instrument or investment security, or
any other payment, transfer, or delivery by, through, or to a financial Institution, by whatever means
effected) conducted or attempted by, at or through the financial institution and Involving or
aggregating $5,000 or more In funds or other assets, if the financial institution knows, suspects, or
has reason to suspect that:
I. The transaction involves funds derived from illegal activities or is intended or conducted In order to
hide or disguise funds or assets derived from illegal activities (including, without limitation, the
ownership, nature, source, location, or control of such funds or assets) as part of a plan to violate
or evade any law or regulation or to avoid any transaction reporting requirement under Federal law,
ii. The transaction is designed to evade any regulations promulgated under the Bank Secrecy Act; or
ill.The transaction has no business or apparent lawful purpose or Is not the sort In which the
particular customer would normally be expected to engage, and the financial institution knows of
no reasonable explanation for the transaction after examining the available facts, including the
background and possible purpose of the transaction.
The Bank Secrecy Act requires all financial Institutions to file currency transaction reports (CTRs) In
accordance with the Department of the Treasury's Implementing regulations (31 CFR Part 103).
These regulations require a financial institution to file a CTR whenever a currency transaction exceeds
$10,000. If a currency transaction exceeds $10,000 and is suspicious, the institution must file both a
CTR (reporting the currency transaction) and a suspicious activity report (reporting the suspicious or
criminal aspects of the transaction). If a currency transaction equals or is below $10,000 and Is
suspicious, the institution should only file a suspicious activity report.
2. A financial institution is required to file a suspicious activity report no later than 30 calendar days after
the date of initial detection of facts that may constitute a basis for filing a suspicious activity report.
If no suspect was identified on the date of detection of the incident requiring the filing, a financial
institution may delay filing a suspicious activity report for an additional 30 calendar days to Identify a
suspect. In no case shall reporting be delayed more than 60 calendar days after the date of Initial
detection of a reportable transaction.
3. This suspicious activity report does not need to be filed for those robberies and burglaries that are
reported to local authorities, or (except for savings associations and service corporations) for lost,
missing, counterfeit or stolen securities that are reported pursuant to the requirements of 17 CFR
240.17f-1.
HOW TO MAKE A REPORT:
1. Send each completed suspicious activity report to:
FinCEN, Detroit Computing Center, P.O. Box 33980, Detroit, MI 48232
2. For items that do not apply or for which Information is not available, leave blank.
3. Complete each suspicious activity report in its entirety, even when the suspicious activity report Is a
corrected or supplemental report.
4. Do not include supporting documentation with the suspicloui activity report. Identify and retain a copy
of the suspicious activity report and all original supporting documentation or business record equivalent
for 5 years from the date of the suspicious activity report. All supporting documentation must be made
available to appropriate authorities upon request.
5. If more space Is needed to complete an item (for example, to report an additional suspect or witness),
a copy of the page containing the item should be used to provide the information.
6. Financial institutions are encouraged to provide copies of suspicious activity reports to state
and local authorities, where appropriate.
